Social media sites are transforming not only the daily lives of consumers, but also how companies interact with consumers. Here at Morrison Foerster, across all of our practice groups, we are seeing complex, cutting-edge legal issues arising out of social media. As with the Internet boom during the mid-to-late 1990s, social media is generating new legal questions at a far faster pace than the law’s ability to provide answers to such questions. In an effort to stay on top of these emerging issues, and to keep our clients and friends informed of new developments, Morrison Foerster publishes this blog devoted to the law and business of social media.<h2>ABOUT MORRISON FOERSTER</h2>Morrison Foerster is a leading global law firm that transforms complexity into advantage for its clients. Our clients include some of the largest financial institutions, banks, consulting and accounting firms, and Fortune 100, technology, and life sciences companies. Highlighting the firm’s commitment to client service, leadership in market-changing deals and impact litigation, and values-based culture, Morrison Foerster has been repeatedly recognized as one of the top 10 firms on The American Lawyer’s A-List. Year after year, the firm receives significant recognition from Chambers and The Legal 500 across their various guides, including Global, USA, Asia‑Pacific, Europe, UK, Latin America, and FinTech Legal. Our lawyers passionately care about delivering legal excellence while living our values. Morrison Foerster has a long-standing commitment to creating a culture that respects and celebrates differences, while providing an inclusive environment. The firm has achieved Mansfield Certification Plus since 2018 as a result of successfully reaching at least 30 percent women, communities of color, and LGBTQ+ lawyer representation in a notable number of current leadership roles and committees. The firm also has a long history of commitment to the community and society through providing pro bono legal services, including litigating for civil rights and civil liberties, improving public education and fostering the wellbeing of children, advocating for veterans, promoting international human rights, enforcing the right to asylum, and safeguarding the environment.

Social

Search

sociallyaware-abajournalweb100-1

Aaron is the chair of the firm’s Technology Transactions Group and co-chair of the Interactive + Digital Media Group. He advises clients on a wide range of complex transactions involving intellectual property and technology, including structuring and negotiating strategic licensing, development, collaboration, procurement, and distribution deals.Aaron’s practice focuses on advising both established and emerging companies in a variety of data- and technology-intensive sectors, including software, SaaS, cloud-based technology, digital media (social media, AR/VR, gaming, streaming media, AdTech), AI, healthcare, consumer electronics, e-commerce, other online business models, and mobile applications. He also maintains an active practice counseling companies on branding and marketing, trademark licensing, and content-related transactions, as well as the intellectual property aspects of mergers, acquisitions, asset spin-offs, and private equity investments.He has represented clients such as Autodesk, Meta, OpenAI, Splunk, Konami, Kaiser Permanente, SoftBank, Visa, and Yahoo, among others.Aaron has been recognized by numerous publications for his work on market-defining technology transactions. He is currently ranked by Chambers USA for “Technology Transactions.”Aaron also serves as co-editor of Socially Aware, the firm’s award-winning newsletter and blog devoted to the law and business of social media, and regularly publishes on various IP and technology-related topics. Aaron is also a sought-after speaker on new and emerging areas of law, and is a frequent presenter and panelist at conferences and legal services programs. In addition to his active practice, Aaron regularly provides pro bono assistance to various nonprofit and charitable organizations such as Common Sense Media and the Starlight Children’s Foundation. He is a member of the board of directors of California Lawyers for the Arts.While in law school at the University of California, Berkeley, Boalt Hall School of Law, Aaron served as executive editor of the California Law Review and was elected to the Order of the Coif. Following law school, Aaron served as law clerk to the Honorable William H. Orrick and the Honorable Martin J. Jenkins, both United States District Judges for the Northern District of California.

rubin_aaron_blog_150x150.png

rubin_aaron_common_640x280.jpg

rubin_aaron_heroretina_2700x1160.jpg

rubin_aaron_mobileretina_750x1040.jpg

rubin_aaron_social_600x600.jpg

Partner

Aaron is the chair of our Technology Transactions Group. He advises clients on a wide range of complex transactions involving intellectual property and technology, including structuring and negotiating strategic licensing, development, collaboration, procurement, and distribution deals. Aaron’s practice focuses on advising both established and emerging companies in a variety of data– and technology–intensive sectors, including software, SaaS, cloud computing, AR/VR, AI, gaming, healthcare, consumer electronics, social media, e–commerce, other online business models, and mobile applications. He also maintains an active practice counseling companies on the intellectual property aspects of mergers, acquisitions, asset spin–offs, and private equity investments.

Aaron P. Rubin

Lawrence Gallick is of counsel in the firm’s Austin office and a member of the Technology Transactions Group.Lawrence focuses his practice on technology transactions and licensing matters. His diverse experience includes advising on SaaS agreements, cross-licensing agreements, research and collaboration agreements, development agreements, and distribution agreements. He counsels a broad range of companies across the software, hardware, life sciences, biotech and FinTech spaces, as well as other entities including universities.He advises clients in connection with general corporate matters including contract negotiations, and leasing and technology placement agreements.Lawrence also serves as co-editor of <a href="https://www.sociallyawareblog.com/" target="_blank">Socially Aware</a>, the firm’s award-winning newsletter and blog devoted to the law and business of social media, and regularly publishes on various IP and technology-related topics.Prior to joining the firm, Lawrence was counsel at another major law firm. Before earning his law degree, Lawrence was a web consultant, project manager, and web developer in Portland, Oregon, where he managed and consulted on projects using industry methodologies and performed custom development and integration of content management systems.Lawrence was named a Super Lawyers “Rising Star” in 2015 and 2018–2022, and is licensed in both California and New York. Lawrence earned his J.D. from the University at Buffalo School of Law, where he was the electronic systems editor for the Buffalo Law Review and awarded the ABA-BNA Award for Excellence in the Study of Intellectual Property Law.

gallick_lawrence_blog_150x150.png

gallick_lawrence_common_640x280.jpg

gallick_lawrence_heroretina_2700x1160.jpg

gallick_lawrence_mobileretina_750x1040.jpg

gallick_lawrence_social_600x600.jpg

Of Counsel

Lawrence Gallick

Anthony Ramirez is a partner in the Technology Transactions Group in the New York office of Morrison Foerster.Anthony advises clients on general commercial and transactional matters. He regularly advises companies on the IP aspects of their M&A transactions. His clients include technology, digital media and content for television and music, financial services, and communications companies with diverse intellectual property assets and issues.His practice focuses on the legal aspects of developing, licensing, and commercializing technology and intellectual property, as well as negotiating general commercial contracts, including outsourcing transactions, as well as content and data licenses. He regularly assists clients with legal issues relating to licensing and commercialization of digital media and content, digital content that is distributed over the Internet or streamed, mobile applications and social media, as well as the licensing of recorded music for distribution via digital platforms. Anthony is also experienced with issues relating to open-source software, software development, artificial intelligence and machine learning, cloud-based technology, and protection of proprietary information.Anthony has extensive experience working on matters involving disruptive technologies, such as blockchain. He has helped fintech clients with general intellectual property issues in connection with terms of service for online financial products and services.Anthony is an integral part of the outside pro bono legal team for nonprofit organizations based in New York, including advising clients on legal issues regarding entertainment, social media, privacy rights, and the negotiation of outsourcing and service agreements. Anthony received his J.D. from the University of Michigan Law School in 2009. He received his B.S. from Cornell University in 2004.

ramirez_anthony_blog_150x150.png

ramirez_anthony_common_640x280.jpg

ramirez_anthony_heroretina_2700x1160.jpg

ramirez_anthony_mobileretina_750x1040.jpg

ramirez_anthony_social_600x600.jpg

Anthony Ramirez is a partner in the Technology Transactions Group in the New York office of Morrison Foerster. He advises clients on general commercial and transactional matters. His clients include technology, media, and communications companies with considerable intellectual property assets. His practice focuses on the legal aspects of licensing and commercializing technology and intellectual property, as well as negotiating general commercial contracts. He also regularly assists clients with legal issues relating to mobile applications and social media.

Anthony M. Ramirez

favicon.ico

favicon-16x16.png

favicon-32x32.png

apple-touch-icon.png

MoFo Favicons

Socially Aware is devoted to the law and business of social media, proactively addressing emerging issues and keeping our clients informed of new developments. We cover fields such as artificial intelligence, privacy and data security, Section 230, intellectual property, and much more.

Welcome to Socially Aware

240920-socially-aware-header.jpg

Welcome to Socially Aware

240920-socially-aware-header

Socially Aware is devoted to the law and business of social media, proactively addressing emerging issues and keeping our clients informed of new developments. We cover fields such as artificial intelligence, privacy and data security, Section 230, intellectual property, and much more.

News and Announcements

Blog - Terms of Use

Blog - Privacy Policy

Blog - Blog Disclaimer

Blog - Attorney Advertising

morrison-foerster-blog-logo.png

Provides a data-driven look at the Federal Circuit.

Federal Circuitry

Brings together legal insights and in-depth analyses on trends and complex issues shaping the global technology industry.

MoFo Tech

Mofo Tech

Equips our clients with the most up-to-date and relevant information on employment and labor law issues.

Employment Law Commentary

In-depth analysis of developments and trends impacting government contracting.

Government Contracts Insight

Government Contracts Insights

Provides insights and reports on the most current class actions lawsuits and product liability issues that affect consumer-facing companies.

Class Dismissed Blog

Class Dismissed

MoFo’s Socially Aware blog provides timely updates and analysis of the many complex and cutting-edge legal and business issues arising out of social media.

Socially Aware

  Linkedin

MoFo LinkedIN

Socially Aware Blog - RSS

Stay Connected

Never miss a post from Socially Aware. Enter your email below to stay up-to-date.

Subscribe

The Law and Business of Social Media

Morrison Foerster - Footer

Blogs -  Home Button

Home

Blog - Topics

Web Scraping

Advertising

Antitrust

Arbitration

Artificial Intelligence

Asia

Autonomous Vehicles

Bankruptcy

Big Data

Blockchain

Class Actions

Cloud Computing

Compliance

Contracts

COPPA

Copyright

Crowdsourcing

Cyberbullying

Cybersecurity

Data Security

Defamation

Digital Content

Disappearing Content

Discovery

DMCA

E-Commerce

E-Discovery

E-Personation

Electronic Contracts

Employment Law

Endorsement Guides

Ephemeral Messaging

Ethics

European Union

Event

Fair Use

FDA Regulations

Financial Institutions

First Amendment

Fraud

Free Speech

GDPR

Hacking

Influencer Marketing

Infographic

Internet of Things

Investment Management Law

JOBS Act

Labor Law

Litigation

Live streaming

Marketing

Mobile

Online Contracts

Online Endorsements

Online Promotions

Online Reviews

Patent

Privacy

Product Liability

Protected Speech

Right of Publicity

Right To Be Forgotten

Section 230 Safe Harbor

Securities Law

Social Media Policy

Statistics

Status Updates

Stored Communications Act

Supreme Court

Terms of Use

Trademark

UK High Court

User-Generated Content

Wearable Computers

Topics

Blog - Editors

Editors

Blog - About

About

Blog - Subscribe

More

Lawrence W. Gallick

Social Links: If the Suit Fits

Social Links: Age Verification, X Appeal, and the Great White North

Social Links: Fake Reviews, Real Rulings, and an Epic Fail

Lawrence W. Gallick on Toth v. Everly Well, Inc.

Social Links: Going Back to Cali

Judge Richard J. Walsh began his opinion in <a href="http://www.theemployerhandbook.com/files/2015/01/Largent.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Largent v. Reed</a> with the following question: “What if the people in your life want to use your Facebook posts against you in a civil lawsuit?” With the explosive growth of social media, judges have had to confront this question more and more frequently. The answer to this question is something you’ll hear quite often from lawyers: “It depends.”Courts generally have held that there can be no reasonable expectation of privacy in your profile when Facebook’s <a href="https://en-gb.facebook.com/">homepage</a> informs you that “Facebook helps you connect and share with the people in your life.” Even when you decide to limit who can see your photos or read your status updates, that information still may be discoverable if you’ve posted a picture or updated a status that is relevant to a lawsuit in which you’re involved. The issue, then, is whether the party seeking access to your social media profile has a legitimate basis for doing so.If you’ve updated your Facebook status to brag about your awesome new workout routine after claiming serious and permanent physical injuries sustained in a car accident—yes, that information is relevant to a lawsuit arising from that accident and will be discoverable. The plaintiff in Largent v. Reed learned that lesson the hard way when she did just that and the court ordered her to turn over her Facebook log-in information to the defense counsel. On the other hand, your Facebook profile will not be discoverable simply because your adversary decides he or she wants to go on a fishing expedition through the last eight years of your digital life.Courts in many jurisdictions have applied the same standard to decide whether a litigant’s Facebook posts will be discoverable: The party seeking your posts must show that the requested information may reasonably lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.For example, the plaintiff in <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/59083827/Zimmerman-v-Weis-Markets-Inc" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Zimmerman v. Weis Markets, Inc.</a> claimed that he suffered permanent injuries sustained from operating a fork lift—and then went on to post that his interests included “ridin” and “bike stunts” on the public portion of his Facebook page. The court determined that his public posts placed the legitimacy of his damages claims in controversy and that his privacy interests did not outweigh the discovery requests.In contrast, in <a href="http://www.x1.com/download/Tompkins_v_Detroit_Metropolitan_Airport.pdf">Tompkins v. Detroit Metropolitan Airport</a>, the plaintiff in this slip-and-fall case claimed back injuries in connection with an accident at the Detroit Metropolitan Airport. The defendant checked the plaintiff’s publicly available Facebook photos (i.e., photos not subject to any of Facebook’s available privacy settings or restrictions), and stumbled upon photos of the plaintiff holding a small dog and also pushing a shopping cart. The court determined that these photos were in no way inconsistent with the plaintiff’s injury claims, stating that if “the Plaintiff’s public Facebook page contained pictures of her playing golf or riding horseback, Defendant might have a stronger argument for delving into the nonpublic section of her account.”The Tompkins court recognized that the plaintiff’s information was not discoverable because parties do not “have a generalized right to rummage at will through information” a person has posted. Indeed, the defendants sought the production of the plaintiff’s entire Facebook account. Their overbroad and overreaching discovery request was—and is—common among parties seeking access to their opponents’ Facebook data.In response to these overbroad requests, courts routinely deny motions to compel the production of a person’s entire Facebook profile because such requests are nothing more than fishing expeditions seeking what might be relevant information. As the court in <a href="https://casetext.com/case/potts-v-dollar-tree-stores" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Potts v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc.</a> stated, the defendant seeking Facebook data must at least “make a threshold showing that publicly available information on [Facebook] undermines the Plaintiff’s claims.”The Tompkins and Potts decisions mark important developments in Facebook e-discovery cases. They establish that a person’s entire Facebook profile is not discoverable merely because a portion of that profile is public. In turn, Facebook’s privacy settings can provide at least some protection against discovery requests—assuming that the user has taken efforts not to display photos publicly that blatantly contradict his or her legal claims.When it is shown that a party’s Facebook history should be discoverable, however, the party must make sure not to tamper with that history. Deactivating your Facebook account to hide evidence can invite the <a href="https://www.sociallyawareblog.com/2015/05/18/effort-to-hide-facebook-evidence-by-deactivating-account-ends-badly-for-louisiana-man/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">ire</a> of the court. Deleting your account outright can even result in <a href="https://www.sociallyawareblog.com/2013/04/16/spoliation-of-social-media-evidence-new-jersey-court-cracks-down/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">sanctions</a>. The takeaway is that courts treat social media data no differently than any other type of electronically stored information; what you share with friends online may also be something you share with your adversary—and even the court.

L.W. v. Snap Inc.,  675 F. Supp. 3d 1087 

Wamai v. Industrial Bank of Korea , 2021 WL 3038402 

In re Maxus Energy Corp.

In re Energy Future Holdings Corp.

James Paul McCartney v. Sony/ATV Publishing LLC

NFL Enterprises LLC v. EchoStar Satellite LLC

VOOM HD Holdings LLC v. EchoStar Satellite LLC

Change Healthcare Operations, LLC v WebMD Health Corp. 2017 WL 6610411  

Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc.

Komag, Inc. v. Asahi Glass Co. Ltd.

Asante Techs. Inc. v. PMC–Sierra, Inc.

Biovail Corp. v. S.A.C. Capital Mgmt. 2009 WL 2844404 

Multi–Faceted Investigation of University Grants

Confidential International Arbitrations

lawrence_j_blog_150x150.png

lawrence_j_common_640x280.jpg

lawrence_j_heroretina_2700x1160.jpg

lawrence_j_mobileretina_750x1040.jpg

lawrence_j_social_600x600.jpg

Alex advises on all aspects of complex commercial litigation in federal and state trial and appellate courts and in arbitration. He has represented U.S. and international clients in actions involving 

J. Lawrence

J. Alexander Lawrence

istock_000056895088_full-300x221-1.jpg

Social Media E-Discovery: Are Your Facebook Posts Discoverable in Civil Litigation?

Social Media E-Discovery: Are Your Facebook Posts Discoverable in Civil Litigation?

Judge Richard J. Walsh began his opinion in Largent v. Reed with the following question: “What if the people in your life want to use your Facebook posts agains

Websites sometimes present their terms of use (“TOU”) to users merely by including a link to those TOU on the website without requiring users to affirmatively accept the terms by, for example, checking a box or clicking an “I accept” button. <a href="https://www.sociallyawareblog.com/2014/10/06/implementing-and-enforcing-online-terms-of-use/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">As we have written previously</a>, Courts tend to look disfavorably on such website TOU presentations, which have become somewhat misleadingly known as “browsewrap agreements,” when determining whether a TOU constitutes an enforceable contract between the website operator and a user. According to a recent federal district court opinion, however, browsewrap TOU might be sufficient to help websites achieve another legal end: providing sufficient notice to defeat a false advertising claim based on an allegedly fraudulent omission.In the case, <a href="http://www.bloomberglaw.com/public/document/Handy_v_LogMeIn_Inc_No_114cv01355JLT_2015_BL_237876_ED_Cal_July_2" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Handy v. LogMeIn, Inc.</a>, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California held that a software vendor’s online terms and conditions provided notice that the company might discontinue its app, and that such notice was sufficient to defeat a customer’s claims under California’s false advertising and unfair competition laws, regardless of whether the customer had affirmatively accepted the TOU.The defendant, LogMeIn, Inc., sells software for accessing computer files remotely from separate computers or mobile devices. LogMeIn previously provided its software as two separate products: LogMeInFree, a free service that allowed users to log into remote computers from a desktop or laptop; and Ignition, a paid service that allowed users to log into computers using mobile devices. Before 2011, the plaintiff, Darren Handy, downloaded LogMeInFree and then paid for Ignition. In 2014, LogMeIn introduced a new paid product called “LogMeInPro,” which merged the features of LogMeInFree and Ignition. Eventually, LogMeIn posted a message on its website stating it would begin migrating users of LogMeInFree and Ignition to the new platform while ending support and maintenance on the older platforms. This required users of LogMeInFree and Ignition to pay for LogMeInPro in order to receive continued support and maintenance for Ignition and to continue to use the functionality previously provided for free as part of LogMeInFree.In response, Mr. Handy brought a class action suit alleging he would never have purchased Ignition if he had known that the company would discontinue support for Ignition or require additional payment for continued access to the LogMeInFree functionality. His suit claimed that LogMeIn violated California Business and Professions Code §§ 17200 and 17500 by fraudulently failing to disclose that the company might discontinue support and change its pricing model for the software.  LogMeIn argued, among other things, that its online TOU reserved the right for LogMeIn “to modify or discontinue any Product for any reason or no reason.” But Handy argued that this statement was not binding on him because he never affirmatively accepted the TOU.The court disagreed, however, holding that “whether the Terms and Conditions constituted an enforceable contract is irrelevant to whether the Terms and Conditions related to LogMeInFree provided notice to prospective purchasers of the Ignition app that LogMeInFree could be discontinued.” The court went on to note that, while LogMeIn’s TOU may not have been “forced on Plaintiff through a clickwrap,” the TOU nonetheless showed that LogMeIn had “publish[ed] the fact that it reserved the right to terminate the free app, LogMeInFree.” Therefore, the court held that there was “an insufficient showing that information related to the future termination of LogMeInFree constituted a material omission when selling the Ignition app.”Clients often ask us whether a “browsewrap” TOU serves any purpose at all, in light of the fact that courts are often disinclined to construe such TOU presentations as creating an enforceable contract. Handy v. LogMeIn, Inc. shows that, in at least some circumstances, the answer is yes: even if a browsewrap does not constitute a contract, it may serve a useful purpose by providing legally significant notices to users.

Aaron is the chair of the firm’s Technology Transactions Group and co-chair of the Interactive + Digital Media Group. He advises clients on a wide range of complex transactions involving intellectual property and technology, including structuring and negotiating strategic licensing, development, collaboration, procurement, and distribution deals.

Aaron Rubin

0813_ccimage_istock_000036595676_large-300x300-1.jpg

Federal District Court: “Browsewrap” Terms and Conditions Provide Sufficient Notice to Defeat False Advertising Class Action

Federal District Court: “Browsewrap” Terms and Conditions Provide Sufficient Notice to Defeat False Advertising Class Action

Websites sometimes present their terms of use (“TOU”) to users merely by including a link to those TOU on the website without requiring users to affirmatively a

In a precedent-setting ruling, the Washington Court of Appeals in <a href="http://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/723219.pdf">Thomson v. Doe</a> refused to grant a motion to compel brought by a defamation plaintiff who had subpoenaed the lawyer-review site Avvo.com seeking the identity of an anonymous online reviewer, holding that, for a defamation plaintiff to unmask an anonymous defendant, that “plaintiff must do more than simply plead his case.”The plaintiff in the case, Florida divorce attorney Deborah Thomson, filed a defamation suit against an anonymous poster of Avvo reviews. Claiming to be a former client, the reviewer stated that Thomson, among other things, failed to live up to her fiduciary duties, failed to subpoena critical documents, and failed to adequately represent the reviewer’s interests.After Avvo refused Thomson’s subpoena seeking the anonymous reviewer’s identity, Thomson moved to compel compliance with the subpoena. The Washington State trial court denied Thomson’s motion and she appealed, presenting the Washington State Court of Appeals with what the court acknowledged was an issue of first impression in the Evergreen state: What evidentiary standard should a court apply when deciding a defamation plaintiff’s motion to reveal an anonymous speaker’s identity?The court began its analysis by describing the holdings of the two leading cases on the issue: New Jersey’s Dendrite Int’l, Inc. v. Doe No. 3, which held that, to unmask anonymous defendants in defamation cases, the plaintiff must “produce sufficient evidence supporting each element of its cause of action on a prima facie basis; and Delaware’s <a href="https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1472540/doe-v-cahill/">Doe v. Cahill</a>, which established that plaintiffs seeking to uncover the identities of anonymous speakers/defendants must clear a slightly higher evidentiary threshold—proof that their claims would survive a summary judgment motion.The court also discussed the one court that “has significantly strayed from Dendrite and Cahill”: the Virginia Court of Appeals. In <a href="http://www.citizen.org/documents/yelp-v-hadeed-virginia-supreme-court-opinion.pdf">Yelp, Inc. v. Hadeed Carpet</a>, another case <a href="https://www.sociallyawareblog.com/2015/04/28/court-protects-anonymity-of-yelp-users/">we recently covered</a> at Socially Aware, the Virginia Court of Appeals “declined to adopt either test, instead applying a state statute that required a lower standard of proof.” Specifically, Hadeed held that, in the Thomson court’s words, “a defamation plaintiff seeking an anonymous speaker’s identity must establish a good faith basis to contend that the speaker committed defamation.”The Thomson court then cited with approval the Ninth Circuit’s approach in In re Anonymous Online Speakers. In that case, the Ninth Circuit determined that, when deciding whether to require disclosure of an anonymous speaker’s identity, the nature of the speech at issue should inform the choice of evidentiary standard. Holding that an online review of an attorney’s services is not merely commercial speech—which, the court explained, would warrant the lowest level of protection—the court rejected the Hadeed (good faith) standard. Since the Avvo review did not qualify as political speech either, the court also discounted the highest level of protection. The court then determined that the “motion to dismiss standard” was “inadequate to protect this level of speech” because, in a <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/notice_pleading">notice pleading</a> state like Washington, “a defamation plaintiff would need only to allege the elements of the claim, without supporting evidence.”Finally, the Thomson court addressed the “two remaining standards”: prima facie (Dendrite) and summary judgment (Cahill). The court ultimately decided that the prima facie standard was appropriate because the anonymous reviewer had yet to appear in the case and the plaintiff, therefore, was not in a position to file a summary judgment motion.The court nevertheless observed that “the important feature” of both the prima facie and the summary judgment standards “is to emphasize that the plaintiff must do more than simply plead his case.” In other words, both standards require “supporting evidence … before the speaker is unmasked.” Under that standard, the court held, “Thomson’s motion must fail. As Thomson freely admits, she presented no evidence to support her motion.”

istock_000026397732_small-300x200-1.jpg

Washington State Court Refuses to Unmask Anonymous Online Reviewer

Washington State Court Refuses to Unmask Anonymous Online Reviewer

In a precedent-setting ruling, the Washington Court of Appeals in Thomson v. Doe refused to grant a motion to compel brought by a defamation plaintiff who had s