Social media sites are transforming not only the daily lives of consumers, but also how companies interact with consumers. Here at Morrison Foerster, across all of our practice groups, we are seeing complex, cutting-edge legal issues arising out of social media. As with the Internet boom during the mid-to-late 1990s, social media is generating new legal questions at a far faster pace than the law’s ability to provide answers to such questions. In an effort to stay on top of these emerging issues, and to keep our clients and friends informed of new developments, Morrison Foerster publishes this blog devoted to the law and business of social media.<h2>ABOUT MORRISON FOERSTER</h2>Morrison Foerster is a leading global law firm that transforms complexity into advantage for its clients. Our clients include some of the largest financial institutions, banks, consulting and accounting firms, and Fortune 100, technology, and life sciences companies. Highlighting the firm’s commitment to client service, leadership in market-changing deals and impact litigation, and values-based culture, Morrison Foerster has been repeatedly recognized as one of the top 10 firms on The American Lawyer’s A-List. Year after year, the firm receives significant recognition from Chambers and The Legal 500 across their various guides, including Global, USA, Asia‑Pacific, Europe, UK, Latin America, and FinTech Legal. Our lawyers passionately care about delivering legal excellence while living our values. Morrison Foerster has a long-standing commitment to creating a culture that respects and celebrates differences, while providing an inclusive environment. The firm has achieved Mansfield Certification Plus since 2018 as a result of successfully reaching at least 30 percent women, communities of color, and LGBTQ+ lawyer representation in a notable number of current leadership roles and committees. The firm also has a long history of commitment to the community and society through providing pro bono legal services, including litigating for civil rights and civil liberties, improving public education and fostering the wellbeing of children, advocating for veterans, promoting international human rights, enforcing the right to asylum, and safeguarding the environment.

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Aaron is the chair of the firm’s Technology Transactions Group and co-chair of the Interactive + Digital Media Group. He advises clients on a wide range of complex transactions involving intellectual property and technology, including structuring and negotiating strategic licensing, development, collaboration, procurement, and distribution deals.Aaron’s practice focuses on advising both established and emerging companies in a variety of data- and technology-intensive sectors, including software, SaaS, cloud-based technology, digital media (social media, AR/VR, gaming, streaming media, AdTech), AI, healthcare, consumer electronics, e-commerce, other online business models, and mobile applications. He also maintains an active practice counseling companies on branding and marketing, trademark licensing, and content-related transactions, as well as the intellectual property aspects of mergers, acquisitions, asset spin-offs, and private equity investments.He has represented clients such as Autodesk, Meta, OpenAI, Splunk, Konami, Kaiser Permanente, SoftBank, Visa, and Yahoo, among others.Aaron has been recognized by numerous publications for his work on market-defining technology transactions. He is currently ranked by Chambers USA for “Technology Transactions.”Aaron also serves as co-editor of Socially Aware, the firm’s award-winning newsletter and blog devoted to the law and business of social media, and regularly publishes on various IP and technology-related topics. Aaron is also a sought-after speaker on new and emerging areas of law, and is a frequent presenter and panelist at conferences and legal services programs. In addition to his active practice, Aaron regularly provides pro bono assistance to various nonprofit and charitable organizations such as Common Sense Media and the Starlight Children’s Foundation. He is a member of the board of directors of California Lawyers for the Arts.While in law school at the University of California, Berkeley, Boalt Hall School of Law, Aaron served as executive editor of the California Law Review and was elected to the Order of the Coif. Following law school, Aaron served as law clerk to the Honorable William H. Orrick and the Honorable Martin J. Jenkins, both United States District Judges for the Northern District of California.

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Aaron is the chair of our Technology Transactions Group. He advises clients on a wide range of complex transactions involving intellectual property and technology, including structuring and negotiating strategic licensing, development, collaboration, procurement, and distribution deals. Aaron’s practice focuses on advising both established and emerging companies in a variety of data– and technology–intensive sectors, including software, SaaS, cloud computing, AR/VR, AI, gaming, healthcare, consumer electronics, social media, e–commerce, other online business models, and mobile applications. He also maintains an active practice counseling companies on the intellectual property aspects of mergers, acquisitions, asset spin–offs, and private equity investments.

Aaron P. Rubin

Lawrence Gallick is of counsel in the firm’s Austin office and a member of the Technology Transactions Group.Lawrence focuses his practice on technology transactions and licensing matters. His diverse experience includes advising on SaaS agreements, cross-licensing agreements, research and collaboration agreements, development agreements, and distribution agreements. He counsels a broad range of companies across the software, hardware, life sciences, biotech and FinTech spaces, as well as other entities including universities.He advises clients in connection with general corporate matters including contract negotiations, and leasing and technology placement agreements.Lawrence also serves as co-editor of <a href="https://www.sociallyawareblog.com/" target="_blank">Socially Aware</a>, the firm’s award-winning newsletter and blog devoted to the law and business of social media, and regularly publishes on various IP and technology-related topics.Prior to joining the firm, Lawrence was counsel at another major law firm. Before earning his law degree, Lawrence was a web consultant, project manager, and web developer in Portland, Oregon, where he managed and consulted on projects using industry methodologies and performed custom development and integration of content management systems.Lawrence was named a Super Lawyers “Rising Star” in 2015 and 2018–2022, and is licensed in both California and New York. Lawrence earned his J.D. from the University at Buffalo School of Law, where he was the electronic systems editor for the Buffalo Law Review and awarded the ABA-BNA Award for Excellence in the Study of Intellectual Property Law.

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Lawrence Gallick

Anthony Ramirez is a partner in the Technology Transactions Group in the New York office of Morrison Foerster.Anthony advises clients on general commercial and transactional matters. He regularly advises companies on the IP aspects of their M&A transactions. His clients include technology, digital media and content for television and music, financial services, and communications companies with diverse intellectual property assets and issues.His practice focuses on the legal aspects of developing, licensing, and commercializing technology and intellectual property, as well as negotiating general commercial contracts, including outsourcing transactions, as well as content and data licenses. He regularly assists clients with legal issues relating to licensing and commercialization of digital media and content, digital content that is distributed over the Internet or streamed, mobile applications and social media, as well as the licensing of recorded music for distribution via digital platforms. Anthony is also experienced with issues relating to open-source software, software development, artificial intelligence and machine learning, cloud-based technology, and protection of proprietary information.Anthony has extensive experience working on matters involving disruptive technologies, such as blockchain. He has helped fintech clients with general intellectual property issues in connection with terms of service for online financial products and services.Anthony is an integral part of the outside pro bono legal team for nonprofit organizations based in New York, including advising clients on legal issues regarding entertainment, social media, privacy rights, and the negotiation of outsourcing and service agreements. Anthony received his J.D. from the University of Michigan Law School in 2009. He received his B.S. from Cornell University in 2004.

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Anthony Ramirez is a partner in the Technology Transactions Group in the New York office of Morrison Foerster. He advises clients on general commercial and transactional matters. His clients include technology, media, and communications companies with considerable intellectual property assets. His practice focuses on the legal aspects of licensing and commercializing technology and intellectual property, as well as negotiating general commercial contracts. He also regularly assists clients with legal issues relating to mobile applications and social media.

Anthony M. Ramirez

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Socially Aware is devoted to the law and business of social media, proactively addressing emerging issues and keeping our clients informed of new developments. We cover fields such as artificial intelligence, privacy and data security, Section 230, intellectual property, and much more.

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Lawrence W. Gallick

Social Links: If the Suit Fits

Social Links: Age Verification, X Appeal, and the Great White North

Social Links: Fake Reviews, Real Rulings, and an Epic Fail

Lawrence W. Gallick on Toth v. Everly Well, Inc.

Social Links: Going Back to Cali

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CHARACTER.AI SUED IN TWO STATESCharacter Technologies has been hit with two lawsuits, including a wrongful death suit (among other claims), in less than two months over its popular Character.ai chatbot. The first was filed in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida (<a href="https://d34mgxl0pedajf.cloudfront.net/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/FILED-COMPLAINT_Garcia-v-Character-Technologies-Inc-1.pdf" target="_blank">Garcia v. Character Technologies Inc.</a>) by the mother of a Florida teenager who <a href="https://www.fastcompany.com/91215310/character-ai-app-lawsuit-legal-complaint-teen-suicide-chatbot-google" target="_blank">tragically committed suicide</a> after the chatbot allegedly encouraged the child to do so. The Plaintiff claims her son became instantly addicted to Character.ai and “fell in love” with the bot, leading to drastic behavioral changes such as sleep deprivation, school-related issues, and low self-esteem, which culminated in the child’s death. Just a few weeks later, two plaintiffs in Texas <a href="https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/25450619-filed-complaint/" target="_blank">filed suit</a> alleging that Character.ai <a href="https://www.npr.org/2024/12/10/nx-s1-5222574/kids-character-ai-lawsuit" target="_blank">abused the plaintiffs’ children</a> by exposing them to hypersexualized content, encouraging self-harm, and suggesting they should kill their parents. Both suits allege that the Character.ai chatbot is intentionally designed in a way that exploits minors by simulating human interaction, creating emotional dependence, and failing to implement safeguards against misuse. Given that these are the first major cases to seek damages related to anthropomorphized AI tech, it will be interesting to see whether juries find Character.ai liable, as this could spawn waves of similar lawsuits.MAJOR RECORD LABELS PETITION SUPREME COURT OVER VERDICT REVERSALThree of the world’s largest entertainment companies—Sony Music, Warner Music, and Universal Music—have <a href="https://tmsnrt.rs/3SX6Do2" target="_blank">petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court</a> to reconsider an appellate ruling that wiped out a $1 billion jury verdict in their suit against internet service provider Cox Communications. In 2019, a <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/lifestyle/cox-to-pay-1-billion-to-music-labels-publishers-over-piracy-infringement-idUSKBN1YO0DE/" target="_blank">Virginia jury</a> found Cox liable for rampant music piracy by the company’s customers and failure to act despite receiving thousands of infringement notices. The verdict was <a href="https://business.cch.com/ipld/SonyMusicEntmtCoxComms4C20240220.pdf" target="_blank">overturned</a> earlier this year by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 4th Circuit, which confirmed the jury’s finding of willful contributory infringement, but called for a new trial on damages because Cox did not directly profit from the piracy. Unsurprisingly, the plaintiffs appealed, and it appears the Supreme Court is poised to take the case. In a <a href="https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/24-181.html" target="_blank">one-sentence order</a>, the High Court has invited the solicitor general to file a brief expressing the views of the United States. This is a strong indication that the Court is interested in hearing the case. With a new administration set to take the reins in Washington next month, it seems likely that appellate attorney <a href="https://www.scotusblog.com/2024/11/trump-taps-lawyer-who-argued-his-immunity-case-for-solicitor-general/" target="_blank">D. John Sauer</a> will be solicitor general. Sauer’s disposition toward IP cases is tough to predict, as his work has largely focused on hot-button social issues. A brief in the case may give insight into Sauer’s positions on copyright law and corporate liability.X CLAIMS OWNERSHIP OF ALEX JONES ACCOUNTThe asset liquidation of Alex Jones’s <a href="https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.txsb.459750/gov.uscourts.txsb.459750.882.0_1.pdf" target="_blank">intellectual</a> and tangible property in the bankruptcy proceeding following the $1.5 billion <a href="https://www.statesman.com/story/news/politics/state/2024/06/06/timeline-lawsuits-alex-jones-sandy-hook-shooting-infowars-false-claims/73985486007/" target="_blank">defamation judgment</a> against him has hit an unusual speedbump. At issue is Jones’s X account. With its 3.4 million followers, the account is among the highest-profile IP assets on the auction block. But here’s the thing: X has <a href="https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.txsb.459750/gov.uscourts.txsb.459750.937.0.pdf?ref=404media.co" target="_blank">filed an objection</a> claiming that the account belongs to it, not Jones, and is therefore exempt from an asset sale. This raises several interesting questions and a judgment either way could have wide-ranging implications for all social media platforms. Though X’s <a href="https://x.com/en/tos" target="_blank">Terms of Service</a> state that users maintain ownership of “any Content you submit, post or display on or through the Services,” the terms do not explicitly define who actually owns the account. An ownership argument in this context is unusual. We’ve been <a href="/topics/owned-second-circuit-holds-that-traditional-principles-of-property-law-apply-to-social-media-accounts" target="_blank">covering</a> social media account ownership issues <a href="/topics/social-links-social-media-account-ownership-once-again-in-the-spotlight" target="_self">for years</a> and in the majority of cases the conflict is between employee/employer or company/consultant. X may very well prevail in this action. Users own their content, but the account itself will likely be seen as an extension of a user’s license to access and use the platform’s services. We’ll be following this one very closely.X LAWSUIT AGAINST ISRAELI DATA SCRAPING FIRM REVIVEDIt appears that Israeli firm Bright Data will be back in court facing an amended version of a complaint from X that was <a href="https://casetext.com/case/x-corp-v-bright-data-ltd-1" target="_blank">dismissed last May</a>. As we <a href="/topics/california-federal-court-holds-x-s-claims-against-scraper-preempted-by-federal-law" target="_self">reported in June</a>, X alleged that Bright Data’s scraping and selling of data from X violated the social media giant’s Terms of Service and the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California held that X’s claims were preempted by federal copyright law. Though the court declined to allow amendments related specifically to Bright Data’s scraping operations, it granted X’s motion for leave to amend the company’s trespass to chattels claims and fraudulent business acts allegations. Judge William H. Alsup ruled that X’s updated complaint sufficiently alleges that Bright Data improperly accessed X’s servers, writing: “X Corp. newly alleges that scrapers traverse the X service in patterns markedly different from humans or authorized machines, that scrapers thus use underlying server capacity in abnormal proportions, and that this results in intermittent, isolated server failures and a ‘glitchy, lagged user experience’ for X’s human users.” Judge Alsup added that X also properly alleged that if it hadn’t purchased “millions of dollars of server capacity,” the alleged scraping would have resulted in “catastrophic system failures,” concluding that, with these revised allegations, “X Corp.’s proposed complaint now sufficiently alleges server impairment from scrapers accessing its service. . . Bright Data does not contest that if X Corp. states trespass to chattels as to data scrapers, it plausibly does so as to Bright Data, too. This order will assume as much.” You can read Judge Alsup’s thorough, and surprisingly entertaining, <a href="https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/67637345/156/x-corp-v-bright-data-ltd/" target="_blank">ruling</a>. Now that this case is set to move forward, we’ll see if it will have wider implications on the legalities of data scraping and platform protection.META PREVAILS IN IMMUNITY SUITUniversity of Massachusetts Amherst professor <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ethan_Zuckerman" target="_blank">Ethan Zuckerman</a> has lost his bid for immunity from potential lawsuits alleging breach of contract and violation of federal criminal computer fraud laws related to his “Unfollow Everything 2.0” browser extension. The extension is designed to allow users to turn off the newsfeeds assembled for them by Facebook’s algorithms with one click, blocking unwanted content and advertisements. Unfollowing functionality is already in place on Facebook but requires unfollowing groups and pages individually. In the <a href="https://casetext.com/case/zuckerman-v-meta-platforms-inc" target="_blank">November 22 ruling</a>, Judge Jacqueline Scott Corley of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California wrote that Zuckerman’s “alleged injury is too contingent upon uncertain events to satisfy the constitutional ripeness requirement” and that the request for relief is too speculative because Zuckerman has not actually released the browser extension. Last May, Zuckerman filed a <a href="https://knightcolumbia.org/documents/gu63ujqj8o" target="_blank">preemptive suit</a> against Meta requesting immunity under Section 230, asking the court to declare that his extension would not violate Facebook’s <a href="https://www.facebook.com/legal/terms?_rdr" target="_blank">Terms of Service</a> or federal computer fraud laws, but this action was also rejected. The current case was dismissed without prejudice, so Zuckerman could refile it if he ever releases the Unfollow Everything 2.0 extension, but after two court losses, he faces significant headwinds.UBER’S ARBITRATION CLAUSE UPHELD BY APPEALS COURTIn a <a href="https://aboutblaw.com/bgm7" target="_blank">5–2 decision</a>, the New York Court of Appeals has ruled that a plaintiff’s legal claims against Uber must go through arbitration—even though her action was currently pending before a court. The ruling stems from a November 2020 lawsuit brought by plaintiff Emily Wu, who originally agreed to a prior version of Uber’s Terms of Service without mandatory arbitration. Uber amended its <a href="https://www.uber.com/legal/en/document/?name=general-terms-of-use&country=united-states&lang=en" target="_blank">Terms of Service</a> in January 2021, updating its mandatory arbitration clause, which Wu agreed to.At the heart of the case is the plaintiff’s argument that the arbitration clause should not apply to claims pending in court, even though the amended Terms of Service purported to apply to “any claims” without limitation. Among other things, Wu claimed that Uber’s notice to Wu violated <a href="https://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model_rules_of_professional_conduct/rule_4_2_communication_with_person_represented_by_counsel/" target="_blank">Rule 4.2 of the Rules of Professional Conduct</a> for attorneys, which bars the other party in a pending lawsuit from directly contacting a party they know is represented by counsel. The Court of Appeals <a href="https://www.reuters.com/legal/government/column-uber-clickwrap-contract-gets-blessing-nys-top-court-theres-twist-2024-11-26/" target="_blank">disagreed with Wu</a>, maintaining that (a) a mass email notification sent by Uber clearly explained there would be changes to the arbitration agreement and that Wu entered into a contract when she agreed to the revised terms; (b) Uber did not know that Wu was represented by counsel when it sent the mass notice; and (c) even if the claim had merit, Wu’s requested remedies were too extreme and she did not even ask for the more targeted and sensible remedy of simply voiding the arbitration agreement and allowing the dispute to move forward in court.In his majority opinion, Judge Anthony Cannataro wrote, “For essentially as long as there have been written contracts, parties have entered them without first carefully reviewing their terms. That failure can have legal consequences, whether the party is a sophisticated entity or an ordinary consumer, and whether the contract is presented on paper or through an electronic pop-up window.”

Lawrence Gallick is of counsel in the firm’s Austin office and a member of the Technology Transactions Group.

Anthony Ramirez is a partner in the Technology Transactions Group in the New York office of Morrison Foerster. Anthony advises clients on general commercial and transactional matters. He regularly advises companies on the IP aspects of their M&A transactions.











Anthony Ramirez

Aaron is the chair of the firm’s Technology Transactions Group and co-chair of the Interactive + Digital Media Group. He advises clients on a wide range of complex transactions involving intellectual property and technology, including structuring and negotiating strategic licensing, development, collaboration, procurement, and distribution deals.

Aaron Rubin

Character Technologies has been hit with two lawsuits, including a wrongful death suit (among other claims), in less than two months over its popular Character.ai chatbot. The first was filed in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida (Garcia v. Character Technologies Inc.) by the mother of a Florida teenager who tragically committed suicide after the chatbot allegedly encouraged the child to do so. 

FAKE REVIEW RULES TAKE EFFECTThe Federal Trade Commission’s new rules banning phony online reviews are now in effect. These rules aim to curb false consumer testimonials, the buying of fake reviews from brokers, review suppression, falsifying social media influence, and misrepresentation of company ownership for review sites. As <a href="/topics/social-links-recent-developments-in-the-law-and-business-of-social-media" target="_self">we reported</a> last August, fake and bot-generated reviews have proliferated at an alarming rate, potentially leading to consumer cynicism, mistrust, and unfair competition. These <a href="https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/ftc_gov/pdf/r311003consumerreviewstestimonialsfinalrulefrn.pdf" target="_blank">new FTC rules</a> have some teeth: non-compliance could result in a $51,744 fine for each violation. It remains to be seen how e-commerce behemoths that host tens of millions of online reviews will navigate compliance, but it’s probably a safe bet there will be some late nights for IT personnel in Seattle and Mountain View. <a href="https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/news/press-releases/2024/08/federal-trade-commission-announces-final-rule-banning-fake-reviews-testimonials" target="_blank">FTC chair Lina Khan said</a>, “Fake reviews not only waste people’s time and money, but also pollute the marketplace and divert business away from honest competitors. [The rule will] protect Americans from getting cheated, put businesses that unlawfully game the system on notice, and promote markets that are fair, honest, and competitive.” It will be interesting to see what e-commerce and review sites look like in six months.MASS. SUPREME COURT RULES IN FAVOR OF MEDICAL DATA TRACKINGThe Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts <a href="https://www.reuters.com/legal/transactional/web-browsing-tracking-doesnt-violate-massachusetts-wiretap-law-court-rules-2024-10-24/" target="_blank">has ruled</a> that website tracking software does not run afoul of the <a href="https://bja.ojp.gov/program/it/privacy-civil-liberties/authorities/statutes/1284#:~:text=1968%2C%20(Pub.-,L.,wiretapping%20by%20government%20officials%2C%20and" target="_blank">1968 Wiretap Act</a>, and sites can continue tracking browser activity without the consent of the user. The <a href="https://fingfx.thomsonreuters.com/gfx/legaldocs/lbpgjobqqvq/10242024sjc_wiretap.pdf" target="_blank">5–1 ruling</a> maintains that two hospitals named in the action—Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center and New England Baptist Hospital—were not breaking the law by collecting and sharing patient data with tracking sites. The plaintiff alleged that the collected data allowed tech companies to profit from private medical data without consent.Writing for the majority, Judge Scott Kafker noted that the 1968 Wiretap Act does not apply to website operators who track data from those who visit, and the law’s legislative history does not lead to the conclusion that it was meant to apply so broadly as to potentially criminalize the interception of web browsing. He added, “If the legislature intends for the wiretap act’s criminal and civil penalties to prohibit the tracking of a person’s browsing of, and interaction with, published information on websites, it must say so expressly.”In a strongly worded dissent, Judge Dalila Wendlandt argued that the Wiretap Act’s prohibition on electronic surveillance does apply to browser tracking because, despite the implied privacy of the hospitals’ online communications, third parties were allowed to track and record patients’ healthcare information. She wrote, “The court decides that the wiretap act provides no recourse despite its prohibition on surreptitious electronic surveillance by private parties. Lamentably, the court is right about one thing; the Legislature will need to correct today’s error.”With hundreds of <a href="https://www.reuters.com/legal/transactional/massachusetts-top-court-considers-allowing-website-tracking-class-actions-2024-04-03/" target="_blank">similar cases</a> filed across the country, this ruling is unlikely to be the final word.LAWSUIT AGAINST X THROWN OUT IN DRAMATIC FASHIONFormer Twitter (now X) executive Mark Schobinger’s attempt to gain class status in a suit over unpaid bonuses <a href="https://www.courthousenews.com/former-twitter-employees-denied-class-action-certification-in-bonuses-suit/" target="_blank">failed in spectacular fashion</a> in a San Francisco courtroom this month. In a <a href="https://www.courthousenews.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/schobinger-vs-twitter-order-denying-motion-class-certification.pdf" target="_blank">scathing order</a>, U.S. District Judge Vince Chhabria wrote that Schobinger “might fit nicely into this case as a defendant,” adding that the suit “reflects remarkable hubris.” The crux of Judge Chhabria’s order comes down to one simple thing—hypocrisy. It turns out that Schobinger himself was a leading advocate for not paying out the very bonuses he is now seeking when he was Twitter’s senior director of compensation. Discovery in the case revealed a litany of messages, emails, and alleged conversations in which Schobinger aggressively lobbied against the bonus payments. Schobinger’s attorney attempted a last-minute swap to bring in a new, untainted plaintiff, but Judge Chhabria stuck to the dance-with-who-brung-ya protocol, saying: “The fact that Schobinger’s lawyer thought it was a good idea to file a motion for class certification in the face of this evidence (as opposed to dropping the case or seeking to substitute another plaintiff immediately upon discovering it) shows that she is totally unqualified to serve as class counsel.” No word yet on whether any <a href="https://youtu.be/DGuOUJ132bU?si=jXRkCGU-0IYlsANt" target="_blank">gavels were broken</a>.ALEX JONES SET TO LOSE IP RIGHTS AND SOCIAL MEDIA ACCOUNTSConspiracy peddler Alex Jones’s social media accounts and IP rights are <a href="https://www.msn.com/en-in/entertainment/oscars/blow-for-alex-jones-as-judge-rules-on-how-he-ll-pay-sandy-hook-victims/ar-AA1rc6WL?apiversion=v2&noservercache=1&domshim=1&renderwebcomponents=1&wcseo=1&batchservertelemetry=1&noservertelemetry=1" target="_blank">likely to be sold</a> to the highest bidder in an effort to pay down the nearly $1.5 billion in defamation judgments levied against him for repeatedly calling the tragic 2012 Sandy Hook school shooting a hoax. Jones’s assets are currently controlled by a court-appointed trustee after he <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/us/alex-jones-files-bankruptcy-following-sandy-hook-verdict-court-filing-2022-12-02/" target="_blank">filed for bankruptcy</a> shortly following the judgment. Many of his tangible assets (including his Infowars studio) are already slated to be auctioned off, but it’s possible the IP assets and social media accounts will prove more valuable at auction. Jones and his legal team maintain that his personal social media accounts are not subject to liquidation and cannot be disentangled from his name, likeness, or image. As one of the <a href="https://youtu.be/_V1vacCrFNs?si=vV9bVHQq9VF1PH1a">least sympathetic defendants</a> in recent memory, Jones faces serious headwinds in his attempt to retain assets.TIKTOK SUFFERS ANOTHER COURT LOSSSocial media juggernaut TikTok’s bid for an en banc panel rehearing has been shot down by the Third Circuit. The action stems from an <a href="https://www.sociallyawareblog.com/topics/social-links-tinder-tiktok-and-the-copacabana" target="_blank">August decision</a> in which the court ruled TikTok and its parent company, ByteDance, <a href="https://cases.justia.com/federal/appellate-courts/ca3/22-3061/22-3061-2024-08-27.pdf?ts=1724792413" target="_blank">were not protected</a> under <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/47/230" target="_blank">Section 230</a> of the Communications Decency Act in the tragic death of a 10-year-old child. TikTok argued that the panel’s August decision went against 30 years of precedent involving Section 230. The court disagreed, citing the U.S. Supreme Court’s <a href="https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/23pdf/22-277_d18f.pdf" target="_blank">Moody v. Netchoice LLC</a> decision in finding that the app’s algorithm qualifies as “expressive content.” The ruling revives a lawsuit by the deceased child’s mother against TikTok, which had been <a href="https://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/223061p.pdf" target="_blank">dismissed in January</a> by the U.S. District Court on Section 230 grounds. This ruling has wide implications for social media companies and is likely to be appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court. We’ll keep a close eye on this one.

Double-check before swiping right. Ubiquitous dating app Tinder scored a court victory when the U.S. District Court in New Jersey ruled in <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/new-jersey/njdce/2:2023cv23115/537965/12/" target="_blank">Ciapinska v. Tinder</a> that the arbitration clause in the app’s terms of use (TOU) is binding. At the center of the suit is Tinder’s <a href="https://www.help.tinder.com/hc/en-us/articles/360034941812-Photo-Verification" target="_blank">photo verification</a> process. The plaintiff <a href="https://bronx.news12.com/elmwood-park-nj-woman-suing-tinder-claims-photos-being-used-fake-accounts" target="_blank">brought the action in late 2023</a> when she discovered that a number of fake accounts, which had passed Tinder’s verification protocol, were using her photos – even though she left the platform in 2019. In the ruling, Judge Jamal K. Semper wrote, “[Plaintiff] created numerous accounts and even purchased a subscription indicating sufficient opportunity to consult and assent to the TOU before continuing to use the platform.” Tinder maintains that its verification tool is not a guarantee.TikTok finds itself facing a federal lawsuit over the <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/crime/tiktok-blackout-challenge-nyla-anderson-b1980820.html" target="_blank">tragic death</a> of a ten-year-old girl who passed away while attempting the viral “blackout challenge.” The challenge dares users to choke themselves to unconsciousness and stream the act on TikTok. The deaths of <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2022-11-30/is-tiktok-responsible-if-kids-die-doing-dangerous-viral-challenges" target="_blank">more than a dozen children</a> have been linked to the viral trend. TikTok parent company ByteDance maintained that Section 230 immunized it from liability, but <a href="https://fingfx.thomsonreuters.com/gfx/legaldocs/mopaqabzypa/08272024tiktok.pdf" target="_blank">three federal judges disagreed</a>. U.S. Circuit Judge Patty Shwartz wrote that Section 230 only immunizes information provided by third parties, not recommendations that TikTok itself made via an algorithm underlying its platform, adding: “TikTok makes choices about the content recommended and promoted to specific users, and by doing so, is engaged in its own first-party speech.” This begs a question: Does any effort to curate the presentation of third-party content automatically make it first-party content and therefore not protected under Section 230?Dupe.com, a startup search tool that scrapes the web for knockoff versions of name-brand products at steep discounts, is <a href="https://www.bloomberglaw.com/public/desktop/document/WilliamsSonomaIncvCarrotCartIncdbaDupecomDocketNo124cv06597SDNYAu?doc_id=X1965IOOO1191OA3O1STJOT2OF2" target="_blank">being sued</a> by home retail colossus Williams-Sonoma. The complaint, which was filed in the U.S. Court for the Southern District of New York, maintains that <a href="https://dupe.com/" target="_blank">Dupe.com</a> illegally used furniture images made by the Williams-Sonoma creative team to promote its online search tool and craft social media ads disparaging the William-Sonoma family of brands. The lawsuit asserts claims for copyright infringement, false advertising, unfair competition, and deceptive trade practices. With the <a href="https://businessofhome.com/articles/furniture-dupes-kim-kardashian-donald-judd-knockoffs#:~:text=Dupe.com%20can%20absolutely%20be,nothing%20clandestine%20about%20that%20functionality." target="_blank">proliferation of dubious online retailers</a> offering counterfeit versions of premier products, we’ll be watching this litigation closely.A <a href="https://www.dailycal.org/news/state/sb-976-approved-aims-to-protect-kids-from-social-media-addiction/article_59dd5e9c-6a6d-11ef-b6f1-87863c2fb22d.html" target="_blank">California bill</a> designed to stop social media companies from using algorithms to target minors has passed the state legislature and is headed to Governor Gavin Newsom’s desk. The legislation is similar to laws <a href="https://www.democratandchronicle.com/story/news/2024/06/10/ny-passes-ban-on-addictive-social-media-for-children-how-it-works/74043024007/" target="_blank">recently passed in New York</a> and could mark the beginning of a significant shift in social media policy across the United States. If the Governor signs <a href="https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billTextClient.xhtml?bill_id=202320240SB976" target="_blank">the bill</a>, social media companies would be prohibited from providing an algorithm-driven social media feed to anyone younger than eighteen in the state of California. It would also ban social media notifications during school hours and at night without prior parental consent. Proponents of the bill feel legislation is necessary to protect children, while critics maintain the law will be difficult to enforce and could be susceptible to misuse.Everyone’s mom’s favorite soft rock icon, Barry Manilow, <a href="https://variety.com/2024/music/news/barry-manilow-sues-hipgnosis-unpaid-funds-1236129154/" target="_blank">has sued</a> Hipgnosis Songs Fund, a music IP investment and song management company that acquired the Manilow catalog in 2020. The suit alleges that Hipgnosis has not paid more than $1 million in contractually obligated bonus payments. Manilow sold the song catalog to Hipgnosis based on promises that the company would exploit social media and spark a <a href="https://www.tiktok.com/@dinandtonics/video/7375244202457845038" target="_blank">“Copacabana” dance trend</a> on TikTok. To the surprise of no one (except perhaps Mr. Manilow), this did not happen. Instead, Hipgnosis hemorrhaged cash after a number of <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/marisadellatto/2023/01/24/justin-bieber-sells-music-rights-for-over-200-million-to-hipgnosis-songs-capital/" target="_blank">high-profile catalog acquisitions</a> and was sold to Blackstone in July 2024. Social media and music streaming have confounded the old guard of the music industry as they’re eclipsed by younger, more tech-savvy artists who have a deeper understanding of the contemporary music business landscape. Despite the nearly identical names, Hipgnosis Songs Fund is not related to the art collective Hipgnosis that designed all your <a href="https://wimwords.com/the-hipgnosis-album-cover-gallery/" target="_blank">favorite 1970s album covers</a>.

Social Links: Tinder, TikTok, and the Copacabana

Social Links: Tinder, TikTok, and the Copacabana

Double-check before swiping right. Ubiquitous dating app Tinder scored a court victory when the U.S. District Court in New Jersey ruled in Ciapinska v. Tinder that the arbitration clause in the app’s terms of use (TOU) is binding.

Social media giant TikTok has been <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/technology/article/2024/aug/02/us-sues-tiktok-bytedance-child-privacy" target="_blank">sued by the United States</a> for allegedly collecting data on children under thirteen illegally. The suit claims the app, which is owned by China-based parent company ByteDance, allowed millions of children to create accounts without parental knowledge or consent despite <a href="https://www.wired.com/story/tiktok-ftc-record-fine-childrens-privacy/" target="_blank">paying a fine of $5.7 million</a> for similar activity in 2019. The United States is seeking penalties of up to $51,744 per violation, per day. The suit comes just three months after TikTok sued the U.S. government over a law that could ban it across the country. Read the <a href="https://assets.bwbx.io/documents/users/iqjWHBFdfxIU/rS0wyWEeUli0/v0" target="_blank">complaint</a> in its entirety.The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit <a href="https://publishers.org/news/dc-circuit-court-rejects-effs-challenge-to-dmca-confirms-symbiotic-relationship-of-copyright-law-and-free-expression/" target="_blank">has rejected</a> a challenge to one aspect of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (<a href="https://www.copyright.gov/dmca/" target="_blank">DMCA</a>). The action was initially brought by Electronic Frontiers Foundation (EFF) in 2016 and argued that Section 1201 of the DMCA – which prohibits the circumvention of technological measures that protect copyrighted works – is unconstitutional under the First Amendment. The <a href="https://publishers.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/Green-v-DOJ-opinion-2024.08.02.pdf" target="_blank">ruling</a> filed by Judge Nina Pillard states that while the First Amendment protects the right to read, it does not guarantee unrestricted access to all reading materials one might desire and does not guarantee potential fair users exceptional access to copyrighted works they wish to include in their expression. EFF maintains that the decision favors large commercial entities over individual fair users and sets a dangerous precedent for the future.Pickpocketing via tweet? Investor and online financial personality Andrew Left <a href="https://finance.yahoo.com/news/short-seller-andrew-left-deleted-110000470.html" target="_blank">deleted his research firm’s entire tweet history</a> from social media platform X ahead of his 19-count <a href="https://prod-i.a.dj.com/public/resources/documents/andrew-left-indictment07-26-2024.pdf" target="_blank">securities fraud indictment</a> and <a href="https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.cacd.934731/gov.uscourts.cacd.934731.1.0.pdf">SEC lawsuit.</a> According to the SEC complaint, Left allegedly engaged in bait-and-switch schemes that involved making public recommendations contrary to his private trading positions which netted him $20 million in illicit gains between 2018 and 2023. The SEC also accused Left of sharing his planned announcements with at least two hedge funds in advance, receiving a portion of their trading profits in return. Left used X as a platform to promote short positions on a number of major companies including Roku, American Airlines, and Beyond Meat. The government maintains that Left’s public tweets were intended to illegally manipulate the market.<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/technology/article/2024/aug/06/elon-musk-x-advertising-lawsuit-antitrust" target="_blank">X has filed suit</a> against several major companies and a global advertising alliance. The suit accuses them of conspiring to boycott the social media platform and withhold advertising dollars in an attempt to damage the platform. Advertising revenue on X has declined since Elon Musk acquired the company in 2022, with many brands expressing concerns over the platform’s lack of content moderation. X chief executive Linda Yaccarino <a href="https://x.com/lindayaX/status/1820838134470328676" target="_blank">characterized the alleged boycott</a> in terms more sociological than financial, writing: “The consequence – perhaps the intent – of this boycott was to seek to deprive X’s users, be they sports fans, gamers, journalists, activists, parents or political and corporate leaders, of the Global Town Square.”Legislation targeting malicious use of deepfake technology <a href="https://www.govtech.com/policy/lawmakers-introduce-bipartisan-bill-to-fight-ai-deepfakes" target="_blank">continues to expand</a> and seems to be among the very few issues that can reliably garner bipartisan support. Representatives Ashley Hinson (R-IA) and Jake Auchincloss (D-MA) have <a href="https://auchincloss.house.gov/media/press-releases/release-auchincloss-introduces-bipartisan-bill-to-tackle-rise-in-non-consensualdeepfakes-on-social-media-platforms" target="_blank">introduced a bill</a> that would eliminate Section 230 protections for tech companies that allow deepfake pornography on their platforms. The bill would require tech firms to implement a “clear and accessible process for reporting, investigating and removing harmful content within 24 hours.” Additionally, it would require data logging that victims could access and a process for removing the offending content. This House bill is on the heels of related deepfake legislation that recently <a href="https://gizmodo.com/anti-deepfake-porn-bill-unanimously-passes-in-the-senate-2000479051" target="_blank">passed the Senate unanimously</a>.

Social Links: August 2024

Social Links: August 2024

Social media giant TikTok has been sued by the United States for allegedly collecting data on children under thirteen illegally. 

In a rare example of bipartisan agreement, the dramatically named DEFIANCE (Disrupt Explicit Forged Images and Non-Consensual Edits) Act unanimously <a href="https://gizmodo.com/anti-deepfake-porn-bill-unanimously-passes-in-the-senate-2000479051" target="_blank">passed the Senate</a>. The bill allows victims of AI-generated deepfake pornography to sue anyone who knowingly creates, receives, or distributes such images. It only addresses civil liability and only applies to pornographic content, but we would not be surprised to see more expansive legislation in this area in the future.Utah’s stringent social media laws survived a court challenge when a federal judge <a href="https://www.ksl.com/article/51076729/federal-judge-dismisses-claim-in-lawsuit-against-utahs-social-media-laws" target="_blank">dismissed a claim</a> by NetChoice that the legislation was preempted by federal law under Section 230. The dismissal by U.S. District Judge Robert J. Shelby cited autoplay, seamless pagination, and notifications on minors’ accounts as outside the scope of Section 230. Utah has become a <a href="https://www.ksl.com/article/50846522/utah-residents-suing-state-over-soon-to-be-enacted-social-media-restrictions" target="_blank">flashpoint</a> in the debate over social media, its impact on children, and related First Amendment concerns.Meta has <a href="https://about.fb.com/news/2024/07/combating-financial-sextortion-scams-from-nigeria/" target="_blank">removed more than 60,000 accounts</a> involved in sexual extortion scams aimed predominantly at men in the United States. The accounts were based in the fraud hotbed of Nigeria and used sexually compromising photos—both real and fake—to blackmail victims. The vast majority of the now-deleted accounts were on Instagram, but Meta also deactivated more than 7,000 Facebook accounts, pages, and groups that offered advice (including scripts) on how to defraud people. Although mostly targeting adults, there were also attempts against minors, which Meta reported to the U.S. National Center for Missing and Exploited Children.In another uncharacteristically bipartisan vote, the <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/congress/senate-poised-pass-significant-child-online-safety-bills-decades-rcna164259" target="_blank">Senate voted 91-3 in favor</a> of the Children and Teens’ Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA 2.0) and the Kids Online Safety Act (KOSA). This is significant legislation that would create a legal “duty of care” for social media companies to prevent and mitigate harm. Violators would be subject to penalties enforced by the Federal Trade Commission. Opponents argue that the bill’s definition of harm is too broad and could lead to censorship of content that promotes politically polarizing issues, gender equality, or abortion rights. The bill will now go to the House, where its passage is less certain. Should it pass, this legislation would dramatically impact the operations of social media companies. We’re watching this very closely.Red-hot AI startup Perplexity has <a href="https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/technology/nvidia-backed-perplexity-ai-inks-deal-with-publishers-to-put-ads-in-search-engine/ar-BB1qTjUy?ocid=BingNewsVerp" target="_blank">entered into agreements</a> with several major media companies including Time, Fortune, and Automattic (owner of WordPress). Perplexity will begin featuring its partners’ content in AI-assisted search results and providing a percentage of the ad revenue. This move is on the heels of plagiarism accusations by news organizations such as Forbes and Condé Nast, the latter of which <a href="https://www.engadget.com/conde-nast-has-reportedly-accused-ai-search-startup-perplexity-of-plagiarism-191639677.html" target="_blank">reportedly sent a cease and desist</a> letter to the startup.The US Copyright Office <a href="https://cointelegraph.com/news/us-copyright-office-reports-urgent-need-protection-ai-law-deepfakes" target="_blank">issued a report</a> calling on Congress to take urgent action on the distribution of unauthorized deepfakes. The report is a result of its 2023 initiative to examine the intellectual property implications of generative AI. The speed of technology has always challenged lawmakers to keep up with bad actors, but AI deepfake capability has moved at staggering speed. <a href="https://www.fastcompany.com/91165063/microsoft-white-paper-new-laws-ai-deepfakes-frauid" target="_blank">Microsoft</a> has also called for Federal legislation addressing deepfakes.

Social Links: July 2024

Section 230: 27 Years Old and Still in the SpotlightIn our fourth installment of our six-part series examining Section 230—the segment of the 1996 Communications Decency Act (CDA) that immunizes online service providers from liability stemming from content created by third parties—we’ll examine some of the more contemporary judicial, legislative, and executive responses to the Act. Read our <a href="/topics/part-1-section-230-27-years-old-and-still-in-the-spotlight" target="_self">first</a>, <a href="/topics/part-2-a-section-230-27-years-old-and-still-in-the-spotlight-" target="_self">second</a>, and <a href="/topics/part-3-section-230-27-years-old-and-still-in-the-spotlight" target="_self">third</a> installments of this series to bring you up to speed on the conversation so far.Section 230 in the age of social media and the rise of user-generated content (UGC)In tandem with the rise of social media and the proliferation of user-generated content, we have recently witnessed numerous Section 230 cases throughout various jurisdictions.In <a href="https://casetext.com/case/fed-agency-of-news-llc-v-facebook-inc-1" target="_blank">Federal Agency of News LLC v. Facebook, Inc</a>. (N.D. Cal. Jan. 13, 2020), a Northern California district court rejected the notion that political speech is not covered by Section 230 immunity. The case concerned Facebook’s removal of user content belonging to the <a href="https://federalnewsnetwork.com/" target="_blank">Federal Agency of News</a> (FAN), which was allegedly tied to Russian government agencies seeking to undermine U.S. institutions. Specifically, the court stated that “[i]mmunity under the Communications Decency Act does not contain a political speech exception . . . . No distinction is made between political speech and non-political speech.” The court ultimately dismissed FAN’s suit with prejudice.In another case involving Facebook—and a case of first impression for the Third Circuit—a district court ruled that Section 230 protects against state-law claims regarding rights of publicity. In <a href="https://casetext.com/case/hepp-v-facebook-inc" target="_blank">Hepp v. Facebook, Inc</a>. (E.D. Pa. June 5, 2020), Karen Hepp, a television news anchor for FOX, brought right of publicity claims against several social media platforms for unauthorized use of her image. The photo in question was taken by a security camera in an NYC convenience store and subsequently used in online ads for erectile dysfunction and dating websites. The court held that Hepp’s statutory and common law right of publicity claims, both based on state law, were covered by Section 230—and in doing so, the court rejected Hepp’s argument that those claims were within the exception described by Section 230(e)(2). That important exception states that intellectual property laws are unaffected by Section 230, but the court aligned itself with Ninth Circuit precedent in holding that only federal intellectual property claims qualify for the exception. In the court’s view, extending the exception to state law intellectual property claims “would fatally undermine the broad grant of immunity provided by the CDA.” As we <a href="/2021/12/21/facebook-rebrands-as-meta-disables-facial-recognition-capabilities/" target="_self">reported previously</a>, <a href="https://today.westlaw.com/Document/Iaf5326271d1d11ecbea4f0dc9fb69570/View/FullText.html?contextData=(sc.Default)&transitionType=Default&firstPage=true" target="_blank">the Third Circuit of the United States Court of Appeals recently dismissed the case</a>, citing that each of these companies were protected and had immunity under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act 0f 1996 (CDA). Read the full opinion of <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca3/20-2725/20-2725-2021-09-23.html" target="_blank">Hepp v. Facebook, No. 20-2725 (3d Cir. 2021).</a>Account terminations in the age of Section 230: Distributor vs. publisher role continues to raise issuesIn <a href="https://casetext.com/case/domen-v-vimeo-inc" target="_blank">Domen v. Vimeo, Inc</a>., (2d Cir. March 11, 2021), Domen, a Christian pastor, published 89 videos on Vimeo promoting “conversion therapy” that were later flagged by Vimeo as violating its policy against promotion of “Sexual Orientation Change Efforts (SOCE).” After a warning period, <a href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2021/03/important-second-circuit-opinion-says-section-230c2a-protects-online-account-terminations-domen-v-vimeo.htm" target="_blank">Vimeo terminated Domen’s account</a>. Domen sued Vimeo for several claims, including on anti-discrimination grounds, arguing that Vimeo had “restricted and censored [his] videos because [they] were based on a viewpoint regarding sexual orientation and religion with which Vimeo disagrees.” The court dismissed Domen’s suit, on Section 230 and other grounds, finding that:<ul><li>Vimeo was acting as a publisher and therefore qualified for Section 230 immunity: “Plaintiffs are seeking to hold Vimeo liable for removing Plaintiffs’ own content . . . . Vimeo plainly was acting as a ‘publisher’ when it deleted (or, in other words, withdrew) Plaintiffs’ content on the Vimeo website”;</li><li>Domen had no argument that Vimeo was applying its policy in a discriminatory manner: “the purpose of Section 230 was to insulate interactive computer services from liability for removing some content, but not other content . . . . There simply are no substantive allegations to support the notion that Vimeo somehow was targeting Domen because he is a ‘former homosexual,’ as Plaintiffs posit”; and</li><li>The anti-discrimination claims independently failed because Domen didn’t allege that Vimeo had the requisite discriminatory intent.</li></ul>Domen filed for appeal and, in March 2021, the 2nd Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling, noting that <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/47/230" target="_blank">subsection (c)(2) of Section 230</a> is a broad provision that forecloses civil liability for providers that restrict access to content they consider objectionable. The court also held that Section 230 does not require the restriction to take any particular form, meaning that Vimeo’s removal of Domen’s account after providing a warning was acceptable.Section 230 in the age of the #MeToo movement: Allegations, backlash, and immunity clauses continue to challenge “third party content”A New York district court recently considered the application of Section 230 to non-traditional online publishers, in <a href="https://casetext.com/case/elliott-v-donegan" target="_blank">Elliott v. Donegan</a>, (E.D.N.Y. June 30, 2020). The defendant, Moira Donegan, had started an electronic list of men in the media business who had allegedly committed some form of sexual violence. She titled her list “Sh**ty Media Men” and stored it on a cloud-based, publicly accessible spreadsheet. The spreadsheet went viral, unleashing a swift flurry of allegations with some 70 named men implicated in the spreadsheet. Major media outlets were poised to publish related stories. Among the men named was the plaintiff, Stephen Elliott, who claimed that the allegations about him on the list were false, and sued Donegan and a number of Jane Does for defamation.Donegan claimed that third parties had posted the statements about Elliot, and that she was therefore immune under Section 230. The court first examined whether Donegan was “a provider or user of an interactive computer service,” which is a threshold requirement for the Section 230 safe harbor. Likening the spreadsheet to a message board that allows individuals to post comments, the court held that Donegan did qualify as an interactive computer service provider.But the court was unable to determine, at least from the face of the complaint, whether the spreadsheet and its material were “third party content.” According to the plaintiff’s allegations, the defendant herself had fabricated and entered the spreadsheet item about him. If those allegations were true, then Section 230 would not apply. Based on this uncertainty, the court refused to dismiss, holding that Section 230 does not warrant the dismissal of a defamation claim where the plaintiff’s complaint did not “foreclose the possibility that defendant created or developed the allegedly unlawful content.”In part five of our series, we’ll continue to examine the criticism from both sides of the political aisle, as well as calls to reform or even repeal Section 230.

In our fourth installment of our six-part series examining Section 230—the segment of the 1996 Communications Decency Act (CDA) that immunizes online service providers from liability stemming from content created by third parties—we’ll examine some of the more contemporary judicial, legislative, and executive responses to the Act. Read our first, second, and third installments of this series to bring you up to speed on the conversation so far.

Part 4 – Section 230: 27 Years Old and Still in the Spotlight

As we <a href="https://www.sociallyawareblog.com/topics/social-links-section-230-under-scrutiny-again-from-lawmakers" target="_blank">reported</a> in 2023, Utah was the first state in the nation to enact laws limiting minors’ use of social media. In early March 2024, Republican Governor Spencer Cox effectively <a href="https://www.msn.com/en-ph/news/politics/utah-governor-replaces-social-media-laws-for-youth-as-state-faces-lawsuits/ar-BB1jYKWB" target="_blank">repealed and replaced</a> the previously enacted legislation in an effort to fend off court challenges from a number of social media companies and industry groups. The new laws require social media companies to verify the ages of their users and disable certain features on minors’ accounts, but do not include the parental consent requirements from the earlier legislation.  Utah also recently enacted <a href="https://le.utah.gov/~2024/bills/static/SB0149.html" target="_blank">legislation</a> that imposes liability on companies for use of AI that violates consumer protection laws if those companies don’t properly disclose the use of AI. The new law also establishes the state’s Office of Artificial Intelligence Policy, and the Artificial Intelligence Learning Laboratory Program, both of which are designed to analyze and research AI technology.Florida governor Ron DeSantis <a href="https://www.flgov.com/2024/03/25/governor-desantis-signs-legislation-to-protect-children-and-uphold-parental-rights/">signed Bill HB3</a>, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/us/floridas-desantis-signs-law-restricting-social-media-people-under-16-2024-03-25/" target="_blank">prohibiting any child under 14 from opening social media accounts</a>, and requiring that children between 14 and 16 obtain parental consent to open accounts. Supporters such as Florida Republican Speaker Paul Renner <a href="https://apnews.com/article/florida-social-media-ban-desantis-fd07f61e167bd9109a83cd7355b5f164" target="_blank">praised the bill</a>, citing the harmful effects of social media on minors, while detractors such as NetChoice’s vice president and general counsel Carl Szabo <a href="https://www.npr.org/2024/03/31/1241888294/privacy-concerns-rise-about-florida-law-requiring-proof-of-age-to-join-social-me" target="_blank">raised concerns</a> over the bill’s impact on data collection, privacy, and security for all citizens, not just minors.<a href="https://news.bloomberglaw.com/tech-and-telecom-law/california-bill-would-ask-social-media-firms-to-verify-accounts" target="_blank">California also is examining account verification</a> in an effort to curb the spread of misinformation to California voters<a href="https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=202320240SB1228" target="_blank">. S.B. 1228</a> would require social media platforms to verify users with large followings to help the public determine and distinguish between content that is created by an actual person and fake content that is created using AI or other means.In New York, a recent measure that would restrict how social media companies use algorithms to serve content targeted to children is meeting with <a href="https://news.bgov.com/states-of-play/ny-social-media-crackdown-faces-albany-delay-after-tech-lobbying" target="_blank">significant resistance</a> from social media platforms and tech industry groups, as well as from civil rights organizations concerned about privacy and groups that work with youth in marginalized populations. Some key New York lawmakers are raising doubts that the measure will be included in the final state budget.At the federal level, President Biden and the Office of Management and Budget just issued a government-wide policy that will require “federal agencies to test artificial intelligence tools for potential risks and designate officers to ensure oversight, actions intended to encourage responsible adoption of the emerging technology by the US government,” <a href="https://url.us.m.mimecastprotect.com/s/hCLgCPN5gGSKz9Y03FzIjl4?domain=news.bloomberglaw.com" target="_blank">according to Bloomberg Law</a>. This policy has the potential to impose sweeping safeguards across a number of federal agencies, including those responsible for transportation and healthcare.In an update on a case that <a href="https://www.sociallyawareblog.com/topics/owned-second-circuit-holds-that-traditional-principles-of-property-law-apply-to-social-media-accounts" target="_blank">we reported on previously</a>, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York <a href="https://news.bloomberglaw.com/litigation/hayley-paige-denied-redo-over-access-to-instagram-account" target="_blank">rejected</a> fashion designer Hayley Paige Gutman’s bid to reclaim sole access to her Pinterest and Instagram accounts (@misshayleypaige) from her former employer, JLM Couture. The court denied Gutman’s request for reconsideration pending resolution of the underlying ownership questions following remand from the Second Circuit.And finally, if you follow tech news at all, you will be aware that noted technology journalist, podcaster, and author <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kara_Swisher" target="_blank">Kara Swisher</a> has a <a href="https://www.npr.org/2024/02/26/1233845063/kara-swisher-burn-book-memoir-tech-industry-dissapointements" target="_blank">new book</a> out. Kara certainly doesn’t need any promotional help from our little blog, but we were interested to hear her comments about one of our favorite topics, <a href="https://www.sociallyawareblog.com/topics/safe-harbor" target="_blank">Section 230</a>, during her appearances on <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=shared&v=yfx7PM1VlCg" target="_blank">Real Time with Bill Maher</a> and <a href="https://youtu.be/wFTuaEx86ak?feature=shared" target="_blank">The View</a>. Swisher, who has researched, covered, and commented on technology for decades, frequently criticizes the lack of regulation around the tech industry.On The View, Swisher noted the absence of guardrails for tech companies and said that Section 230 “gives them complete immunity from liability.” On Real Time, she stated “Do you know how many regulations there are specifically addressing tech companies? Zero…. And the one that does – Section 230 – which is widely debated…it gives them broad immunity.” We here at Socially Aware don’t necessarily agree with Kara’s sweeping characterization of the Section 230 immunity (as we <a href="https://www.sociallyawareblog.com/topics/part-3-section-230-27-years-old-and-still-in-the-spotlight" target="_blank">have reported</a>, the safe harbor is subject to many limitations), but we remain big fans of her work.

Social Links: April 2024 

Social Links: April 2024

As we reported in 2023, Utah was the first state in the nation to enact laws limiting minors’ use of social media.

Social Links: April 2024

In the prior two installments of our six-part series examining Section 230, the section of the 1996 Communications Decency Act (CDA) that immunizes online service providers from liability stemming from the publication and filtering of content created by a third party, we looked at the <a href="https://www.sociallyawareblog.com/topics/part-1-section-230-27-years-old-and-still-in-the-spotlight">origins of Section 230</a> and <a href="https://www.sociallyawareblog.com/topics/part-2-a-section-230-27-years-old-and-still-in-the-spotlight-">the early cases</a> that established the broad scope of the safe harbor.In this third installment, we examine a trend in the cases that started in about 2015, in which the broad interpretation of Section 230 that characterized the early cases started to meet with some resistance and plaintiffs found ways to plead around the safe harbor. If you missed our prior installments, we suggest that you go back and read those before moving on to this third installment (here are <a href="/topics/part-1-section-230-27-years-old-and-still-in-the-spotlight" target="_self">Part 1</a>, <a href="/topics/part-2-a-section-230-27-years-old-and-still-in-the-spotlight-" target="_self">Part 2(A)</a>, and <a href="/topics/part-2-b-section-230-27-years-old-and-still-in-the-spotlight" target="_self">Part 2(B)</a>).Before we discuss the cases referenced above, recall that a defendant receives immunity under <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/47/230" target="_blank">Section 230(c)(1)</a> only if:<ol><li>it is a provider or user of an interactive computer service (“Prong One”);</li><li>whom the plaintiff seeks to treat as a publisher or speaker of information (“Prong Two”); and</li><li>that information was provided by another information content provider (“Prong Three”).</li></ol>See <a href="https://casetext.com/case/barnes-v-yahoo-inc-3" target="_blank">Barnes v. Yahoo! (9th Cir. 2009)</a> for this three-prong articulation.This opens three potential lines of attack for a plaintiff seeking to overcome a defendant’s Section 230 defense:<ul><li>Attack Prong One. Defendant’s liability is not related to being a provider or user of an interactive computer service.</li><li>Attack Prong Two. Defendant’s liability is not based on being a publisher or speaker of information.</li><li>Attack Prong Three. The information at issue was not provided by another information content provider.</li></ul>We will now look at a series of cases in which plaintiffs successfully attacked Prong One, Prong Two, or Prong Three.Attack Prong One. Defendant’s liability is not related to being a provider or user of an interactive computer service. Prong One is not usually at issue in cases where a platform (e.g., a social media site) is the defendant. Platforms are almost always deemed to be providers of interactive computer services. But courts sometimes struggle with immunity for users (as opposed to providers) of interactive computer services. This typically arises in cases where an individual forwards or shares defamatory content originally created by someone else. As we saw in cases such as <a href="https://www.eff.org/files/batzel-v-smith.pdf" target="_blank">Batzel v. Smith</a> and <a href="https://www.eff.org/files/barrett-v-rosenthal.pdf" target="_blank">Barrett v. Rosenthal</a>, discussed in <a href="/topics/part-2-a-section-230-27-years-old-and-still-in-the-spotlight-" target="_self">Part 2</a>, courts have often extended the Section 230 immunity to users in accordance with the plain language of the statute. But not always. And sometimes, when they rejected the applicability of Section 230 in these situations, courts did so either by ignoring that users are also protected under Section 230 or by finding that the defendant was not acting as a user with respect to the objectionable conduct.<a href="https://casetext.com/case/maxfield-v-maxfield-7" target="_blank">Maxfield v. Maxfield</a>, a Connecticut case from 2015, is an example of this. In Maxfield, the plaintiff sued his ex-wife for defamation, claiming that she forwarded screenshots of defamatory tweets about him to his current wife. The ex-wife defended on Section 230 grounds, based on the fact that she forwarded third-party tweets but did not write the tweets herself. The court, however, found that she was not covered by Section 230 immunity because she “merely transmitted” the defamatory messages. The opinion states: “Ms. Maxfield does not operate a website and plainly is not ‘a provider of an interactive computer service.’ While she might, on occasion, be considered a ‘user of an interactive computer service,’ she did not do so in the behavior alleged in the complaint.” Therefore, the court rejected the defendant’s Section 230 defense.Attack Prong Two. Defendant’s liability is not based on being a publisher or speaker of information.Attacking Prong 2 by arguing that the defendant’s liability is not based on acting as a publisher or speaker has often met with success. As we discussed in <a href="/topics/part-2-b-section-230-27-years-old-and-still-in-the-spotlight" target="_self">Part 2</a>, <a href="https://www.eff.org/files/barnes-v-yahoo.pdf" target="_blank">Barnes v. Yahoo!</a>, was an early example of this. In that case from 2009, the Ninth Circuit held that Section 230 did not immunize Yahoo from the plaintiff’s promissory estoppel claim because the claim was not based Yahoo’s activities as a publisher or speaker but rather from Yahoo’s promise to remove the third-party content at issue. Such cases were relatively rare, however, for about the first decade of Section 230’s existence.That started to change with cases such as <a href="https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2016/05/31/12-56638.pdf" target="_blank">Doe v. Internet Brands</a>, a Ninth Circuit case from 2016 in which a Jane Doe plaintiff sued Internet Brands, the parent company of Model Mayhem, alleging that the site’s operators were negligent in failing to notify its users of the risk that rapists were using the website to find victims. Consequently, Doe argued, she was drugged and raped by two assailants who had used the website to lure her to a fake audition.The plaintiff argued that Section 230 did not apply because a “failure to warn” claim did not depend on Model Mayhem being the publisher or speaker of content provided by another person. The Ninth Circuit bought the plaintiff’s argument and overturned the district court’s earlier dismissal of the case, which had been based on Section 230 immunity.In his opinion, Judge Clifton explained that Jane Doe did not seek to hold Internet Brands liable as a publisher or speaker of content posted by a user on the website, or for its failure to remove content posted on the website. Instead, she sought to hold Internet Brands liable for failing to warn her about information it obtained from an outside source about how third parties targeted victims through the website. This duty to warn would “not require Internet Brands to remove any user content or otherwise affect how it publishes or monitors such content.” Since the claim did not treat Internet Brands as a publisher or speaker, the court ruled that Section 230 did not apply.A similar argument worked—to an extent—in <a href="https://casetext.com/case/darnaa-llc-v-google-inc-1" target="_blank">Darnaa v. Google</a>, a Northern District of California case from 2016 that involved YouTube’s removal of the plaintiff’s music video based on YouTube’s belief that the plaintiff had artificially inflated view counts. The plaintiff sued for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, interference with prospective economic advantage, and defamation. She sought damages and an injunction to prevent YouTube from removing the video or changing the video’s URL.The district court held that Section 230(c)(1) preempted the plaintiff’s interference claim, but not her good faith and fair dealing claim. The court explained that the latter claim sought to hold YouTube liable for breach of its good faith contractual obligation to the plaintiff, rather than in its capacity as a publisher; as such, Section 230 did not shield YouTube against this claim.In yet another case from 2016, the Northern District of California court in <a href="https://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2324&context=historical" target="_blank">Airbnb v. City and County of San Francisco</a> denied Airbnb’s request for a preliminary injunction barring enforcement of a San Francisco ordinance that makes it a misdemeanor to provide booking services for unregistered rental units. Airbnb argued that such an ordinance would conflict with Section 230, which contains an express preemption clause stating that no liability may be imposed under any state or local law that is inconsistent with Section 230. But the court held that the ordinance did not treat Airbnb as the publisher or speaker of Airbnb’s rental listings because the ordinance applies only to providing and collecting fees for booking services in connection with an unregistered unit, and does not regulate what can and cannot be published. Therefore, the court denied the request for preliminary injunction.Attack Prong Three. The information at issue was not provided by another information content provider.As we noted in <a href="/topics/part-2-b-section-230-27-years-old-and-still-in-the-spotlight" target="_self">Part 2</a> in connection with the <a href="https://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-9th-circuit/1466388.html" target="_blank">Roommates.com</a> case, Section 230(c)(1) immunity only applies if the relevant information was “provided by another information content provider.” If the defendant itself created the relevant content, in whole or in part, then it cannot avail itself of the safe harbor. In the time period we are looking at here, plaintiffs increasingly met with success in attacking this Prong Three element of Section 230.In <a href="http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2161&context=historical" target="_blank">Diamond Ranch Academy v. Filer</a>, a 2016 district court case from Utah, the plaintiff, who ran a residential youth treatment facility, sued the defendant, who ran a website where those who had attended plaintiff’s facility could share their experiences, for defamation. The defendant asserted a Section 230 defense, arguing that she had merely summarized “many of the core complaints about [the plaintiff’s facility] in a format that [was] more digestible than reading through many separate survivors’ testimonies,” and, in doing so, was exercising her prerogative as a publisher (after all, publishers often edit materials before publishing them). The court disagreed. The court pointed out that the defendant’s posts “do not lead a person to believe that she is quoting a third party. Rather, [she] has adopted the statements of others and used them to create her comments on the website.” The court also noted that some of the third-party statements did “not retain their original form.” With respect to the summaries of third-party statements, the court held that the plaintiff was not entitled to immunity under Section 230 because she was the author.In the 2016 case <a href="http://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/rssExec.pl?Submit=Display&Path=Y2016/D11-14/C:15-3049:J:Williams:aut:T:fnOp:N:1862727:S:0" target="_blank">Huon v. Denton</a>, the Seventh Circuit Court refused to immunize the defendant from liability for an allegedly defamatory comment posted on its website. The case involved a comment to a story published on Jezebel, a property owned by Gawker, that called the plaintiff a “rapist.” The court held that the plaintiff’s claim survived the defendant’s motion to dismiss on Section 230 grounds because the plaintiff had plausibly alleged that Gawker employees anonymously authored comments to increase traffic to the website (even though there was no allegation that Gawker employees had written the specific allegedly defamatory comment at issue).In <a href="https://casetext.com/case/samsel-v-desoto-cnty-sch-dist" target="_blank">Samsel v. DeSoto County School District</a>, a 2017 case from the Northern District of Mississippi, the superintendent of a school district forwarded to 48 principals in his district an email that he had received from the chair of the school board. The chair of the school board had received the original email from a math teacher. The email from the math teacher contained allegedly defamatory statements about the plaintiff, a football coach. When forwarding the email, the superintendent included a cover note asking the recipients to “[p]lease share this email with your staff from the Chairman of our School Board. As Superintendent I agree with [the chair of the school board] 100 percent! Tell your staff they have permission to respond at will.” The plaintiff sued the superintendent for defamation and the superintendent attempted to invoke Section 230(c)(1).The district court acknowledged that persuasive authority from other courts suggested that the default rule was that “one who forwards an email written by another which contains defamatory statements enjoys immunity under [Section 230],” but it distinguished the current case on the grounds that the superintendent added defamatory content (i.e., the cover note). According to the court, the superintendent’s position gave him access to information that could confirm or deny the truth of the math teacher’s statements, so his expression of “100 percent” support of the chair’s email “essentially endorsed and confirmed the veracity of the accusations, in the eyes of the reader.” Therefore, the court held, “a jury could reasonably find that [the superintendent] . . . essentially became a publisher of defamatory material himself, within the meaning of [Section 230].”***Please look out for installment number four of this six-part series, where we continue to trace the history of Section 230.

In the prior two installments of our six-part series examining Section 230, the section of the 1996 Communications Decency Act (CDA) that immunizes online service providers from liability stemming from the publication and filtering of content created by a third party, we looked at the origins of Section 230 and the early cases that established the broad scope of the safe harbor.

Part 3 – Section 230: 27 Years Old and Still in the Spotlight

Recent <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2024/01/31/tech/big-tech-executives-senate-hearing-teens/index.html" target="_blank">Senate hearings</a> on social media safety have spotlighted the urgent need to protect children online, a concern that’s increasingly challenging the legal frameworks governing online platforms. Against this backdrop, the immunity that online platforms enjoy under <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/47/230" target="_blank" dir="ltr">Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act</a> remains a contentious issue.Here at Socially Aware, we have been tracking <a href="/topics/the-decline-and-fall-of-section-230" target="_self">the backlash against Section 230</a> for many years, and the pressure has only intensified recently. But to paraphrase Mark Twain, rumors of Section 230’s death have (so far) been greatly exaggerated, and the statute still provides platforms with robust protection in many cases, as illustrated by a <a href="https://caselaw.findlaw.com/court/us-dis-crt-cd-cal/115681333.html" target="_blank">recent opinion</a> out of the Central District of California dismissing claims against the dating app Grindr. This is <a href="/topics/appeals-court-upholds-section-230-protections-in-case-against-grindr" target="_self">not the first time</a> that Grindr has benefited from Section 230 protection.<a href="https://www.grindr.com/" target="_blank" dir="ltr">Grindr</a> is a popular LGBTQ+ dating application. The app requires users to provide an email address and verify that they are over 18, permitting them to create a profile including their geolocation and other information. The app uses the information that users provide to match them with other users who are “geographically proximate.”The case, John Doe v. Grindr, arose when the plaintiff, a minor, was matched with four adult men, with whom he chatted and whom met in person, ultimately leading to his sexual assault and rape in each instance. Doe sued Grindr for child sex trafficking and distributing a defective product, asserting claims of strict product liability, negligence, negligent misrepresentation, and violation of the <a href="https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/senate-bill/3949" target="_blank" dir="ltr">Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act</a> (TVPRA). He alleged that Grindr’s app is an inherently dangerous software product, that Grindr knows that minors use the app, and that sexual predators use it to target minors.Grindr moved to dismiss Doe’s claims, arguing that they were all barred by Section 230. The court applied the Ninth Circuit’s standard three-prong test, as originally articulated in <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/05-36189/05-36189-2011-02-25.html" target="_blank" dir="ltr">Barnes v. Yahoo!</a>, to determine Section 230’s applicability. This approach asks three questions: (1) is the defendant a provider or user of an “interactive computer service,” (2) does the plaintiff’s claim seek to treat the defendant as a “publisher or speaker,” and (3) was the content at issue provided by “another information content provider”? If these conditions are met, then the defendant is entitled to Section 230 immunity (assuming no other exception applies).The court easily determined that Grindr is an interactive computer service for purposes of the first prong of the test. The more interesting questions involved the second and third prongs, with Doe arguing that his claims did not treat Grindr as a publisher or speaker of content provided by a third party.Doe argued that his claims arose from Grindr’s design, development, and sale of a defective product rather than from Grindr’s activities as a publisher or speaker, relying on the Ninth Circuit case <a href="https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2021/05/04/20-55295.pdf" target="_blank" dir="ltr">Lemmon v. Snap</a> (which <a href="https://www.sociallyawareblog.com/topics/ninth-circuits-snap-decision-limits-section-230-immunity" target="_blank">we wrote about previously</a>). In Lemmon, the Ninth Circuit held that Section 230 did not apply to negligent design claims based on Snapchat’s “Speed Filter” feature, because those claims did not treat Snap as a publisher or speaker of information provided by another information content provider, but rather targeted Snap’s allegedly “unreasonable and negligent” design decisions. Similarly, Doe argued, Grindr’s app is defective in that it matches children with adults for in-person sexual encounters and facilitates the exchange of sexually explicit material.The court, however, distinguished Lemmon, noting that the allegedly defective match function in Grindr’s product relies on and publishes a user’s profile and geolocation data, which is third-party content generated by the user. To support this conclusion, the court cited <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/18-15175/18-15175-2019-08-20.html" target="_blank">Dyroff v. Ultimate Software</a> (finding that an app’s features, functions, and algorithms that analyze user content and recommend connections “are tools meant to facilitate the communication and content of others”), <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=18029531304035617061&hl=en&as_sdt=6&as_vis=1&oi=scholarr" target="_blank">Herrick v. Grindr</a> (noting that Grindr’s geolocation feature is based on a user’s mobile device’s longitude and latitude), and <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/07-50345/07-50345-cv0.wpd-2011-02-25.html" target="_blank">Doe v. Myspace</a> (rejecting argument that negligence claims were predicated on the lack of safety features to protect minors from communicating with predators). According to the court, Grindr received the user content from Doe and the adult men and published it via the match feature’s notification. If Grindr had not published that user-provided content, Doe and the adult men would never have met and the sexual assaults never occurred. [Citation omitted.] Thus, Doe’s claims require the Court to treat Grindr as a publisher of user content.On the third prong of the test—i.e., whether the relevant published material came from a third-party content provider—Doe argued that Grindr materially contributed to Doe’s harm by matching closely located children and adults on its app and that, therefore, his claim was not based only on third-party content. The court was not convinced, finding that the matching feature was based entirely on the geolocation information and user profiles provided by the users, which is publication of information created by third parties. According to the court, “Grindr is not an ‘information content provider because it did not create or develop information, but rather published information created or developed by third parties.’” [Internal citations omitted.]Regarding the TVPRA claim, Doe argued that Section 230 did not immunize Grindr because the <a href="https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/1865" target="_blank">Allow States and Victims to Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act of 2017</a> (FOSTA) exempts child sex trafficking claims from the statutory safe harbor. Citing <a href="https://caselaw.findlaw.com/court/us-9th-circuit/1972265.html" target="_blank">Does v. Reddit</a>, however, the court noted that the FOSTA exception only applies when the platform itself contributed to the sex trafficking by knowingly benefiting or facilitating the illegal activities (we wrote about Does v. Reddit <a href="/topics/ninth-circuit-interprets-fosta-restriction-on-section-230-narrowly" target="_self" dir="ltr">here</a>).Here, because Doe told Grindr he was over 18, Grindr did not know that Doe was a minor, so Grindr was not directly liable under the TVPRA. Moreover, the court held, Doe’s allegations that Grindr knowingly benefitted (e.g., by selling ads) from sexual predators using the app did not mean that Grindr knowingly benefited from participating in child sex trafficking. According to the court, Grindr’s alleged generalized knowledge that sexual predators used the app was not sufficient to implicate Grindr in a “causal relationship between its own affirmative conduct furthering the sex-trafficking venture and its receipt of resulting ad revenues.” [Internal citations omitted.] Therefore, the FOSTA exception to Section 230 immunity did not apply.This case underscores the robust protection that Section 230 continues to provide to online platforms, even as societal concerns regarding social media’s impact on children reach fever pitch. As debates around Section 230 rage, Doe v. Grindr illustrates that the safe harbor provided by the statute remains potent, highlighting the complex interplay between ensuring online safety and maintaining the internet’s open, interactive nature.

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Associate

Lindsay is an associate in the Technology Transactions Group of Morrison Foerster.

Lindsay B. Harris

Lindsay Harris

Central District of California Upholds Grindr’s Immunity Under Section 230 Amidst Growing Concerns over Social Media Safety for Children